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et al.: Labor Law

LABOR LAW
I.

POST-SEPARATION COMPENSATION UNDER NON-COMPETE AGREEMENT
DENIED TO

EMPLOYEE

TERMINATED FOR CAUSE

Schuermann v. American KA-RO Corp.' is an employment law
case that presents a unique question concerning non-compete agree-

ments. In this case the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
right of an employee to enforce the non-compete clause in his employment contract. Prior to this case courts have focused attention on protecting the employee from employer enforcement of unreasonable noncompete agreements. To this end, courts often have voided agreements
as being contrary to public policy when the agreements have unduly
restricted a former employee's ability to earn a living.2 Research has
revealed no cases, however, in which a court has been asked by an employee to enforce a non-compete contract.
This unusual situation arose because the contract obligated American KA-RO Corp. to pay their employee, Schuermann, for not competing. Employers generally have not included separate post-employment
payment in non-compete agreements. In South Carolina a mere "at
will" employment contract is sufficient consideration for the employee's agreement not to compete after employment.'
Schuermann resulted from disputes over an employment contract
created between a German company and an employee in Germany.
The contract contemplated the start of a new venture in South Carolina, which Schuermann was to manage. hi the event Schuermann's
employment with the company ceased, American KA-RO would pay
him 75 percent of his salary for two years as consideration for his not
engaging in competitive activities.4
American KA-RO eventually terminated Schuermann because of

1. 295 S.C. 64, 367 S.E.2d 159 (1988).

2. See, e.g., Associated Spring Corp. v. Roy F. Wilson & Avnet, Inc., 410 F. Supp.
967 (D.S.C. 1976). "It is a universal maxim that covenants not to compete ... are to be
strictly construed and enforced only under certain circumstances because they constitute
restraints upon trade and contracts in general restraint of trade are contrary to public
policy." Id. at 976.
3. Riedman Corp. v. Jarosh, 290 S.C. 252, 253, 349 S.E.2d 404, 405 (1986).
4. The German Commercial Code requires that consideration for a non-competition agreement be at least half the most recent salary paid the former employee. J. GRES
& H. JUNG, HANDBOOK OF GERMAN EMPLOYMENT LAW 81 (1983).
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an extra-marital affair with the wife of an immediate subordinate.'
Thereafter, the company notified him of its intent to abandon the employment contract, including the non-compete clause. In an attempt to
receive the compensation under the agreement, Schuermann put forth
two arguments supporting enforcement of the non-compete clause.
Schuermann first argued the parties intended to contract in exception to the South Carolina rule that a "for cause" termination is a
breach of the employment contract by the employee. 6 An employee
breach extinguishes the employee's right to separation benefits.7 He
pointed out that, unlike another clause of the contract dealing with
separation benefits, the non-compete clause was not conditioned on his
duty of loyalty to his employer. The court rejected this argument because, other than the contract itself, Schuermann offered no proof of
intent to change the rule that bars a breaching employee from enforcing separation benefits.' The court's holding extends the rule that an
employee terminated "for cause" has no right to demand separation
benefits by denying terminated employees the right to demand such
benefits offered in consideration for an employee's promise not to
compete.
The holding also extends the reasoning of Associated Spring v.
Roy F. Wilson & Aunet Inc.9 The district court in Associated Spring
denied a breaching employer the right to enforce a non-compete agreement. In Schuermann, however, the breaching employee was denied
that right. The Associated Spring court stated, "[I]t seems imperative
that [courts] recognize that a covenant otherwise reasonable in form
and scope may become unreasonable when enforcement is sought by a
party who has breached the very contract which contains the
covenant."10
Schuermann extends the logic of this rule to prevent the breaching employee from enjoying the fruits of a contract he has breached,"
A contrary holding would have resulted in unfairness to the employer.
South Carolina's employers would have been in the untenable position
of facing the possibility that they could be compelled to pay additional
compensation to an employee terminated for theft or other acts con-

5. Record at 119.
6. Schuermann, 295 S.C. at 66-67, 367 S.E.2d at 160.
7. Meredith v. Mount Pleasant Boat Bldg. Co., 286 S.C. 115, 333 S.E.2d 565
(1985); Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 270 S.C. 489, 242 S.E.2d 551 (1978); Freeman v. King Pontiac Co., 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478 (1960).
8. Schuermann, 295 S.C. at 66, 367 S.E.2d at 160.
9.410 F. Supp. 967 (D.S.C. 1976) (relying on language from Standard Register Co.
v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961)).
10. Id. at 977.
11. Record at 32.
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trary to the employer's interest.
Schuermann's second argument was that the non-compete agreement was severable from the employment contract. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision to construe the
contract as a whole with the covenant. The trial court offered the following three reasons for its decision: (1) a non-compete covenant must
be ancillary to an otherwise lawful contract; (2) the consideration provided for in the covenant, as required to make the covenant lawful, did
not cause the covenant to be severable; and (3) severability was not
12
stipulated in the covenant.
Had the agreement been found severable, the court might have
ruled either way. North Carolina and Georgia have ruled that a breach
of the main employment contract by an employer does not necessarily
extinguish the right to enforce severable covenants prohibiting competition. 3 Thus, the court in Schuermann could have used neighboring
authority by analogy to support Schuermann's claim.
In Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,14 however, the South
Carolina Supreme Court established that employees have a general
duty of loyalty to the employer implicit in any contract for employment. A non-compete agreement arguably is part of the overall employment agreement, regardless of its severability from other aspects of
the employment relationship. On this basis, the South Carolina Supreme Court could have considered Schuermann's transgression to
reach the covenant, severable or not.
Given that most non-compete covenants do not provide for additional consideration for employees after separation, the employee has
been the one to benefit when an employer ignored the agreement. As
foreign employers become more commonplace, however, this very well
may change. Furthermore, domestic businesses may be influenced by
employment contracts used by companies such as American KA-RO.
As a result, it is possible that Schuermann v. American KA-RO Corp.
is the first in a line of cases to come throughout the country.
Attorneys who practice in the field of employment law should advise their clients to avoid potential lawsuits by not providing for postseparation compensation in employment contracts. Employers who of-

12. Record at 31-32. The issues of contract interpretation were tried to the judge
by consent. Therefore, based on the court's finding of "competent evidence in the record," as required by the standard set forth in Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266
S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976), the court affirmed the decisions below. See Schuermann,
295 S.C. at 66, 367 S.E.2d at 160.
13. See Mansfield v. B. & W. Gas, Inc., 222 Ga. 259, 149 S.E.2d 482 (1966); Orkin
Extermination Co. v. Gill, 222 Ga. 760, 152 S.E.2d 411 (1966); Wilson v. Wilson, 261 N.C.
40, 134 S.E.2d 240 (1964); Edgerton v. Taylor, 184 N.C. 571, 115 S.E. 156 (1922).
14. 270 S.C. 489, 242 S.E.2d 551 (1985).
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fer non-compete agreements that provide for such payment needlessly
expose themselves to the expense and burden of litigation. South Carolina courts recognize "at will" employment contracts as sufficient consideration for covenants not to compete. Generally, offering anything
more will be of little benefit to employers.
Susan A. Fretwell
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